

rom: M.A., London

Report no. 42012.

Transfer to the same

December 27,

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DECLASSIFIED Authority\_NND 740058 Brigade. The brigade group should be the basic formation on which divisions and corps should be built up.
(An outline organization is given in Appendix "A"attached) "Ad Hoc" formations. These should not be created, except as a last resort. Divisional Reconnaissance Unit. Divisions must have their own armoured reconnaissance unit. As an interim measure a motor cycle battalion should be 3. Headquarters. areas. These have increased in size and now have to be divided during active operations; they should be organized and equipped originally into operational and rear headquarters. Troops for defence against aircraft and tanks should be provided for formation headquarters and not drawn from the fighting troops of the formation. Tactics tor Contact officers proved invaluable. Withdrawal and defence ater mobility; carriers scout cars
(a) In withdrawal or hastily eprepared defence the occupation of a water line is sound. (b) When time is available, the water line should cover the divisional reserve position, whilst the forward defended localities will be based on a continuous chain of natural and artificial tank obstacles. (c) The whole length of an obstacle, especially a water line must be covered by our own fire. (d) Slit trenches afford the best protection from enemy action
(a) including dive bombing; alternative sites must be included in all lay-outs. Is being worked out by Corps. (e) Anti-tank guns must be sited in great depth, must be linside infantry localities, defileded from the front, and should engage tanks by surprise in enfilade. (a) The Germans, having gained a small bridgehead, push their mobile troops through on a narrow front, with complete disregard to open flanks. Any bridgehead must, therefore (d) be counter-attacked immediately. (b) An obstacle over which a bridgehead has been established at one point, ceases to be a sure obstacle for its whole strength. The strength of the lines before against Tanks. (a) Offensive spirit in dealing with tanks is essential and special tank hunting platoons should be organized. (b) Anti-tank mines must be carried with the brigade transport susble. Report No. 42012 December 27, 1940

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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 740058 imployment of Air resources. (a) Field Regiments should be reorganized into three (a) Closer co-operation between the Army and R.A.F. is required. (b) Air attack as "supporting fire" for both armoured and infantry formations as employed by the Germans proved of outstanding value. An air formation capable of giving close support at short notice should form an integral part of infantry formations and armoured divisions. (c) For reasons of morale, until (b) above can be put into effect, the R.A.F. should carry out close support in forward areas. required. army co-operation aircraft cannot carry out tactical or artiflery reconneissance with their existing type of aircraft unless they have local air superiority; itry, might be possible with a strong fighter escort or with aircraft of the fighter type. two parts: 8. Command and Control-ile operations. (a) Motor Contact officers proved invaluable. be hel(b); Commanders need greater mobility; carriers, scout cars or motor cycles should be provided for all commanders. (c) Greater use must be made of wireless for intercommunication at all times, certain measures will be necessary to counter enemy D.F. organization or folding book (d) Cipher is too slow inside and forward of Corps areas;
13. Signa simple word codes are of value instead, and should be adopted. ganization of G.H.Q. requires to be sore Administration. (a) Administrative plans should be on broader lines in the form of directives, details being worked out by Corps. (b) Refugees. A prearranged plan is essential and controll-ling forces must be in position before the main refugee movement starts. (c) The number of transport vehicles in a Corps is too high, the reduction should be considered by an expert committee (d) Scales of reserves of S.A.A.. petrol, and equipment should be reduced and carried in vehicles from a pool of transport oved very effective be increased by four carriers, one for the control of movement behind divisions should be dealt

16. As with by a specially trained organization on the lines of the French R.R., the use of fighting troops for this role is uneconomical. 10. M.M.d's A higher proportion of machine gun bittallons are An armoured car regiment with wheeled vehicles proved From M.A. invaluable. Report No. 42012 Troops should be increased to five per squadron. From M.A. London Report No. 42012 December 27, 1940

11. Royal Artillery PART II.

R.A.C.(a) Field Regiments should be reorganized into three batteries of two troops each of four guns.

- (b) Medium Regiments. The 6" How., with its limited range, should be an integral point of the basic fighting formation.
- (c) Anti-tank Regiments. An increase in the allotment of anti-tank regiments is required. k weapon, at least
- (d) A.A. Regiments. An increase in the allotment of both Heavy and Light A.A. aptillery, especially in the for-

(a) ward areas, is required.

(a) Require their own rear link and anchor wireless sets.

12. Royal Engineers ed vehicles required. Preferably 12 scout

- (a) The organization of the field company is satisfactory, but the equipment should be drastically reduced. The G.1098 should be divided into two parts:-
  - (a) Arquiped For static warfare. 1 per troop.

The latter should NOT be carried by field companies but be held in reserve at an Engineer dump.


- (b) Bridge Company. This is too large and unwieldy. It should be divided into sections. An all-purpose bridge capable of taking a tank, is required. There should be nothing between this and Kapok or folding boat

- (b) sequipmental shield is required.
  (c) A tractor giving better protection against S.A.A. is

  13. Signal organization portG.H.Q. erequires to be demore mobile, should be increased from 5 to 6 (excluding the
  - (f) Battrackeduline laying whicle; with a good cross-becountry performance; ris required, yespecially for lion sartillery sections.

- (a) The battalion requires an anti-tank gun platoon of its a rown. The control should be corrected in training.
  b) 400 feet should be added to the predicted height
- (4b) The scale of 3" morters should be increased, telephones and cable should be provided for morter platoons.
- (d) A barrage should be maintained against the leading 15. Carriers. These proved very effective. The platoon should be increased by four carriers hone for C.O. for Command purposes.
- 16. A.A.I.M.G's. Tropossible twin mounted Brens should be introduced.
- 17. M.M. G. A higher proportion of machine gun battalions are required to cover the wide frontages held by infantry formations.
- (d) Kerrison predictor is not required in From M.A. London Report No. 42012 December 27, 1940

A REPORTING A742018



### R.A.C.

- Armoured Car Regiment. oper cent of motor cycles for field
  - 4-man vehicle is essential.

  - (a) 4-man venicle is essential.
    (b) Vehicles must be 4-wheel drive.
    (c) Wireless sets to have the power of No.9 sets.
    (d) Vehicles must be proof against A.P. S.A.A.
    (e) All vehicles require an antietank weapon, at least Infant.8 Beisa, preferably 2 pr. gun.
- Divisional Cavalry Regiment of from 2 to 8.
  - (a) Require their own rear link and anchor wireless sets.
    (b) Some wheeled vehicles required. Preferably 12 scout or armoured cars in R.H.Q. and with an A. A. e) Armour of carriers requires raising by 2 or 3

#### R.A.

- Field Regiment.

  (a) Armoured O.P's increased to h per troop.tley multiple for each officer. A decrease can be made in the number of cars.
- Anti-tank Regiment.
  - (a) A proportion of anti-tank guns should be on armoured,

  - self-propelled mountings.

    (b) An improved shield is required.

    (c) A tractor giving better protection against S.A.A. is

  - required.

    (d) All troops should be commanded by an officer.

    (e) One regimental transport officer should be added.

    (f) Gun crew should be increased from 5 to 6 (excluding the
  - Battery Commander requires a scout car.
  - (h) Battery Captain requires a motor cycle with a pillion
  - seat.
    (i) Cooking facilities should be on a gun basis. Auslly.
- Heavy A.A. Regiment.

  - Faulty fire control should be corrected in training. 400 feet should be added to the predicted height. Fire at single aircraft should be limited to initial
  - burst of eight rounds.
  - (d) A barrage should be maintained against the leading aircraft of mass formations.(e) 3" is more suitable than 3.7" for mobile operations.

## Light A.A. Regiment.

- (a) Single aircraft should NOT normally be engaged.
  (b) Fire should be held until the enemy is within 1,000 yards (ground range.)
  (c) An addition of two men for meteor is required.
- (d) Kerrison predictor is not required in forward areas.

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R.E. 7. (a) More weather proof (plastic) explosives are required.
(b) An increase of 30 per cent of motor cycles for field companies is required. Below Corps, 3-ton lorries should be replaced by 30 cwt. lorries. No. 3 Wireless sets should be abolished on of the army as the result Sigs. Infantry Battalion. 1. Armour (a) Sniper rifles increased from 2 to 8.

(b) 3" morters increased from 2 to 6.

(c) Verey pistols increased to 1 per section, with a generous scale of cartridges. It is a which a generous scale of cartridges. It is a which a generous scale of cartridges. It is a which a scale of cartiers requires raising by 2 or 3 inches a later of the carrier should carrynsmoke grenades. It is a scale of the carrier should carrynsmoke grenades. It is a scale of the carrier platoon.

(i) The scarfe ring should be added to the carrier platoon.

(i) The scarfe ring should replace the motley mounting to be and on wehicles with a closed cab.

(j) Anti-tank guns should be used 1 per section, carrier and group of five vehicles. It is a section of the carrier ammunition should be 75 per cent H.E. the lease of the carrier ammunition should be 75 per cent H.E. the lessons of th25 peracent smoke. The small could be applied use-10. Transport. should be made to ton lorries are too heavy for en cas mobile road and the A convoys.
of the C(b) Wireless should be provided for headquarters of head to control troop carrying companies.
the Companies A.A. Small arms fire. The value of this must be stressed. It is not practicable for platoon commanders to control A.A. fire; men should be trained to fire individually. are Headquarters dy been promulgated in army Training Memorance quarters. A.C.S.M. should be provided for divisional head-There has the considerable discussion as to whether the brigade group or the APPENDIX should be the basic fighting formation of all arms. APPENDIX and warfars it is essential that forward company assessments as able to sail to be seential. that forward OUTLINE ORGANIZATION OF THE BRIGADE GROUP
apporting ar ibrigade H.Q. Therefore, in mobile warfare, frontages are Brigade Signal Section. Issue of the cattle density and the speed Brigade A.A. platoon.

Three infantry battalions.

One company M.G. battalion.

One field regiment.

One troop 4.5" Hows.

One battery anti-tank regiment. Report No.42012 December 27, 1940


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DECLASSIFIED Authority\_NND 740058 ming fixed 6" How. regiment. the basic righting formation. These are: Light A.A. regiment. Div. recce. unit.
(a) It is difficult to determine the correct normal
proportion of supporting arms in a brigade group. The reorganisation of the Army as the resulty field of the campaign in France. Vary from time 1. Armoured Formations! to concentrate all available supporting The main lesson of the campaign in Flanders was the need for a high proportion of armoured divisions in which motorized infantry should work in very close lieison with armoured units. The campaign also proved the value of the wheeled armoured regiment. Arrangements have therefore been made to raise additional armoured divisions, and the divisions, excluding those for the Middle East, are being reorganized as laid down in War Office letter 20/R.A.C./74 dated 5th October. 2. The Bartholomew Committee. A committee was set up under the chairmanship of General Sir William Bartholomew to report to the C.I.G.S. on the lessons of the operations in Flanders which could be applied usefully to our present organization and training, and to suggest modification in our organization, training and equipment which should be made to meet a possible invasion of this country. These recommendations were then considered by the General Staff and the Army Council. In deciding how far the recommendations of the Committee should be carried into effect, the Army Council had to consider two potent factors which had been excluded from the Committee's review, namely that the army must still be organized to fight in any part of the world, and that organization is to some extent tied to the programme of equipment production. The decisions of the Army Council have now been prom-ulgated in War Office letter 20/den/5884 (s.D.l.) dated 13th October, 1940. The salient features of the new organization are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs. The tactical lessons have already been promulgated in Army Training Memoranda. 3. The basic fighting formation. platoon

There has been considerable discussion as to whether the brigade group or the division should be the basic fighting formation of all arms. In very mobile warfare it is essential that forward commanders should be able to call immediately on the supporting arms. The lowest formation which can deal with a force of all arms is the brigade. Therefore, in mobile warfare, where frontages are indeterminate, and the issue of the battle depends on the speed with which local successes can be exploited, the brigade commander should have supporting arms under his command.

The German technique of dive-booking attacks on for-ward troops has made it necessary to provide a higher proportion from M.A. London sling wiReport No. 42012 atta December 27, 1940-ion, twin brens are to be provided in place of the single gun, and a heavier weapon is to be depicted. The division will have a regiment of 43 light All the cor which are permanently sub-ellotted to sach share a continuous approved unit, which will be areas a sub-contict for A.A. defence, is being designed for the light All the land of the projective unit.



There are, however, serious disadvantages in organiaing fixed brigade groups as the basic fighting formation.

- (a) It is difficult to determine the correct normal proportion of supporting arms in a brigade group.
- (b) It is certain that the proportion of supporting arms required by brigades particularly field artillery and engineers will vary from time to time.
- (c) There will still be occasions on which it will be desirable to concentrate all available supporting arms. If a proportion is permanently attached to brigade groups, central control in the event of a temporary withdrawal from the brigade group is a matter of improvisation. As an example, when medium machine guns formed part of the infantry battalion, it was a matter of some difficulty to handle all machine guns on a brigade basis. On the other hand, the machine gun battalion organization allows any degree of concentration or decentralization that may be desired.

In view of the lack of flexibility of the brigade group organization, the Army Council has therefore decided to retain the division as the normal basic fighting formation of all arms.

The disadvantages of a permanent allotment of supporting arms to brigades do not apply with equal force to anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and one battery of each has been permenently allotted to each infantry brigade. A regimental headquarters, has, however, been allotted in each case to the division, which will render it possible to concentrate anti-tank and anti-aircraft resources when necessity arises.

## 4. Reconnaissance.

The need for a reconnaissance element in every formation and forward unit is recognised. The battalion has the carrier platoon, which will in future be combined with the motorcycle platoon. The division will have a Reconnaissance Battalion, portions of which can be decentralized to brigades as required. The battalion will contain three companies each containing three scout platoons and one infantry platoon carried in 30-cwt trucks. The scout platoons will each contain one section of 5 armoured reconnaissance vehicles and two sections of carriers. The organization is laid down in detail in War Office letter 20/Gen/5927 (S.D.1.) dated 16th November, 1940. Anti-tank guns on self-propelled mountings will be added when they become available: meanwhile an anti-tank platoon armed with anti-tank rifles is provided in the headquarter company. Armoured fighting vehicles cannot be provided for some time to come owing to the expansion of the R.A.O.

#### 5. Anti-aircraft defence.

The German technique of dive-bombing attacks on forward troops has made it necessary to provide a higher proportion of weapons for dealing with this form of attack. In the battalion, twin brens are to be provided in place of the single gun, and a heavier weapon is to be designed. The division will have a regiment of 48 light A.A. guns, 12 of which are permanently sub-allotted to each brigade. In addition, a protective unit, which will be armed with light automatics for A.A. defence, is being designed for the local protection of brigade and divisional

CONFIDENCE

(Par.No.5 cont.)

headquarters.

## 6. Anti-tank defence.

Similar factors apply to the organization of anti-tank defence. The anti-tank guns are to be increased from 48 to 64 within the division, exclusive of any which may be allotted to the divisional recommaissance unit. The infantry brigade ant-tank company will disappear, each brigade being allotted a battery of the anti-tank regiment. The brigade and divisional protective units will conatin anti-tank rifles for the protection of headquarters. the protection of headquarters. the division is likely to prove

## 7. Field Artillery.

It is proposed to introduce the more flexible organization of three 8-gun batteries per regiment. This reorganization, together with the addition of extra gun numbers and other personnel which have been found necessary involves an increase of 12 Officers and 222 other ranks in each regiment. In view of the considerable man-power commitment involved no change will be made in the British Army until an investigation of the man-power situation has been completed.

It is also proposed to allow armoured O.Ps. on the scale of one per troop instead of one per battery.

The range of the 6" howitzer is too short for effective counter battery work under modern conditions, but it is a valuable form of reinforcing artillery, One regiment has, therefore, been allotted to each division.

8. Engineers.

#### 8. Engineers.

The present engineer organization is flexible since field companies are self-contained units which can be detached for indefinite periods. No alteration is proposed.

With the disappearance of the pioneer battalion from the divisional organization, other provision must be made for semi-skilled labour to assist engineer troops. It is proposed to allot A.M.P.C. companies as corps troops. The number of companies per division is now under consideration.

The distribution of bridging equipment is under consid-MARTIN F. SCANLON. rig. General, U. S. Military Air Attach eration.

#### 9. Signals.


Minor adjustments will be necessary to fit in with the ery organization. new artillery organization.

## 10. Machine guns.

The inclusion of one machine gun battalion in each division is the logical outcome of the arguments which have been developed in the preceding paragraphs.

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DECLASSIFIED Authority\_NND 740058 11. Services. The establishments of R.A.S.C., R.A.M.C., and R.A.O.C. will need amendment to fit the increased number of units to be included within the division and the increased establishments of certain fighting units. No major alterations are proposed. 12. The Independent Brigade Group. For certain operations the division is likely to prove too large a formation, and accordingly a strictly limited number of independent brigade groups are to be formed. These will be miniature divisions. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there is no intention of departing from the division as the normal basic formation. Reports have been submitted under I.G. Numbers covering:-The Division No. 41939 2017-1089/29
The Infantry Battalion No. 41961 2017-1089/30
The Brigade Group No. 41960 2017-534/263
Armoured O.P. for Artillery No. 41973 2281-0-28110 Changes in Artillery Nos.41939, 41499, 41642 Organization 2017-843/11 Mayan Comad G. BRYAN CONRAD 2017-1125/11 Major, Field Artillery, Asst. Military Attache. 1st. Ind. No. 42012 Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, London, England. Dedember 27, 1940. To: A.C. of S., G-2, War Dept. Washington, D.C. Martine & Baculon MARTIN F. SCANLON, Brig. Ceneral, U. S. Army, Military Air Attache, Acting Military Attache. December 27, 1940 From M.A. London Report No.42012 - 10 -

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